这两天很多人开始翻中苏交恶的那段历史——那段历史的存在，只能证明在国际政治上即使是“同志加兄弟”，也一样靠不住的——更何况其它呢？
Patrick Tyler 出生于冷战期间，曾经是《纽约时报》的首席记者。所以你可以相信他对中国没有任何偏向，对苏联没有任何偏向。Patrick Tyler 写过一本书：《A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China》。
下面是这本书中的一小段。这一小段也许就可以帮助你们理解国际政治到底是什么。
This was Nixon's inner fear of China—the vision of a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons—and it was hardly different from the Kennedy-Johnson-Rusk view, the view that Averell Harriman had pressed on Nikita Khrushchev in the summer of 1963 and that had prompted both Washington and Moscow to believe that the two superpowers could together prevent China from joining the nuclear club.
......
In late June, Kissinger laid out for Nixon the opportunity that had presented itself, the cosmic trade that might change the course of history. He catalogued the "solid evidence" of the growing Soviet obsession "with their China problem" and suggested that the matter had reached the point where "it can be turned to our advantage, if they are in fact attempting to ensure our neutrality in their Chinese containment policy, if not our active cooperation."
Nixon sent the memo back to Kissinger with praise.
"This is our goal," he wrote in the margin."
The clear implication of Kissinger's formulation and Nixon's response was that American neutrality, or even cooperation, in the event of a Soviet attack on China might be up for sale. The price: Soviet assistance in winning a dignified exit from Vietnam and obtaining greater cooperation on the entire East-West agenda—arms control, Berlin, and the Middle E'ast. Where Kennedy and Johnson had failed due to Soviet reluctance, Nixon might now succeed—thanks to the triggering event on Damansky Island.
“Damansky Island”，就是珍宝岛。如果你看懂了上面这段内容，你会发现“中国人民的老朋友”基辛格曾经给尼克松提出建议，认为美国可以在珍宝岛事件上保持中立，甚至和苏联合作对抗中国，以换取苏联在越南问题上的帮助。
尼克松给他点了个赞。